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An acquaintance once shared the story of a family whose attic was infested with
squirrels. The family would hear the squirrels scampering about above their ceiling. But
whenever they went to the attic, the squirrels were out of sight. All of their efforts to keep the
squirrels out of the attic, or to trap and evict the squirrels, failed. The squirrels even chewed
through the metal wire that was placed in front of any opening to the outside. I joked that this
family had an infestation of “omnipotent squirrels.”
Proving racial discriminatory treatment in the workplace, or at the hiring phase, is a lot
like trying to trap “omnipotent squirrels.” Racial discrimination is often disguised and elusive. It
stays out of sight. It is difficult to eradicate. And most of all, it is usually difficult to catch it in
clearly visible discriminatory acts.
This essay will focus upon disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 Disparate treatment occurs where an employer has treated a particular
person less favorably than others because of a protected trait. A plaintiff must establish that the
employer had a discriminatory intent or motive for taking an adverse job-related action.2
However, direct evidence of intent to discriminate is difficult to obtain. Few employers
articulate racial animus or prejudice in an explicit fashion, or leave a paper trail with “smoking
gun” evidence, since doing so would guarantee defeat. 3 For this reason, the Supreme Court

1 Title

VII prohibits discrimination in “terms, conditions, or privileges” of work and the adoption of policies or
practices that “deprive any individual of employment opportunities because of a protected classification (race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin) that adversely impacted the employee in the terms and conditions of his or her
employment. Pub.L. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 255; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(West).
2 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009).
3 United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
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offered Title VII plaintiffs an alternative. The three-step burden-shifting analytical framework
established in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
was designed to permit plaintiffs to provide circumstantial or indirect evidence that an employee,
or job applicant, in a protected group, was singled out and treated less favorably than others
similarly situated, thereby establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If a plaintiff
establishes this prima facie case, the employer, to prevail, must rebut the plaintiff’s evidence by
proffering a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” The
plaintiff then has the opportunity to offer evidence to persuade the court that the employer’s
explanation is unworthy of credence, and therefore, is most likely a pretext for discrimination. 4
The McDonnell-Douglas framework was premised upon the “baseline assumption” that
discrimination is an explanatory variable because it remains a pervasive reality in the American
workplace.5 When a plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, a
“presumption of invidious intent” arises from the plaintiff’s membership in a disfavored group. 6
As Justice Souter argued, when the employer’s proffered reasons are exposed as implausible,
then the decision was more likely than not the result of racial discrimination.7
However, numerous Supreme Court decisions since the early 1990’s have made it more
difficult for racial employment discrimination plaintiffs to prevail by eroding this baseline

4

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253-56, 255, n. 8 (1981). The framework is also referred to as McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine.
5
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 328
(1997); David Simson, Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on You Again: How Disparate
Treatment Doctrine Perpetuates Racial Hierarchy, 56 H OU. L. REV. 1033, 1090 (2019
6 Adamson v.

Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity ,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181-82 (1995).
7 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 530-35 (1993)(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Simson, supra note 6,
at 1090.
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assumption. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks8 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 9
moved the proverbial goal-line for plaintiffs by holding that the factfinder’s rejection of the
employer’s proffered reason for its adverse employment action does not necessarily establish that
the employment action was more likely than not the result of impermissible discrimination.
Courts have also created other “sub-doctrines” that make it even more difficult to prove
intentional discrimination, such as the “stray remarks doctrine” 10 and the “same actor defense.” 11
Approval for overt discriminatory attitudes and actions has diminished since the passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. “Second generation racism” is more subtle, suppressed, and
implicit and therefore, harder to prove. 12 Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Charles
Lawrence, III, many legal scholars have argued that courts should permit evidence of implicit
bias. Drawing upon psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology, Lawrence argued that the
source of most racial harm is found primarily in unconscious racist acts. 13 Linda Hamilton
Krieger, among others, has been an advocate of the thesis that most employment discrimination

8 St.

Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 511, 519 (1993).
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
10 The stray-remarks doctrine is the legal rule that a decision maker's occasional or sporadic use of stereotyped
remarks or derogatory comments about an employee's age protected class is insufficient, without more, to establish a
violation of Title VII because the prejudices revealed in such comments may not have been a factor in the
employment decision. Knox v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 909 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Kerri Lynn
Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, , 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 609-10 (2011).
11 The same-actor defense is possible when an employer’s decision-maker first makes a decision that benefits the
claimant and later, the same supervisor or decision-maker makes another decision that adversely affects the
claimant. The implicit theory supporting the doctrine is that a decision -maker with biases against members of a
protected group would not, for example, have hired a member of the group in the first place. Therefore, the
subsequent adverse decision cannot be discrimination. Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor
Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing of Bias , 104 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2016).
12 The term “second-generation racism” was coined by law professor Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001); Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying
Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 930 (2016).
13 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322 (1987).
9 Reeves
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today is caused by implicit bias that is uncontrollable and unconscious.14 It has been proposed
that implicit bias evidence might serve to create an inference of discrimination when workplace
decisions have discriminatory results, but decision-makers do not believe they harbor animus.15
However, as Michael Selmi argues, recourse to implicit bias is problematic for Title VII
disparate treatment claims. Labeling discrimination as unconscious and uncontrollable, is likely
to place it beyond legal reach, thereby making it more difficult to prove since governing legal
standards often turn on one’s ability to control one’s behavior. 16 Since there is no singular
consensus within the discipline of psychology about human consciousness, the nature of the
unconscious mind, and the relationship between conscious and unconscious processes, there is
little to be gained legally by appealing to unconscious biases, if the concept of “unconscious” is
tethered to any particular theoretical account of the unconscious. 17
Instead of turning inward to the unconscious, the way forward is to turn outward to
analysis of socially mediated patterns of racial bias and racial discrimination. The search for
evidence of patterns of social interaction, such as an inclination toward reinforcing racial
hierarchy. The litigator’s task is to scour the facts of the case for subtle racial biases embedded in
patterns of interaction and habits of speech, such metaphor, cultural tropes and stereotypes.
The central argument of this essay is that culturally pervasive racial schemas, stereotypes,
attitudes, beliefs, and legitimating ideologies, with deep roots in western history, provide some
of the most important resources for lawyers representing Title VII discrimination plaintiffs.

14 Krieger,

supra note 6, at 1170.
supra note 12, at 934-35. Bornstein is describing the implicit bias in employment law. This is not her
own position.
16 Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ . ST . L. J. 193, 195, 197-98
(2018).
17 John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella, The Unconscious Mind, 3 PERSEPCT . PSYCHOL . SCI . 73, 73-74 (2008).
15 Bornstein,
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Long-standing racial schemas that have shaped the social imagination of large segments of
American society provide a metaphorical “lens” to enable the identification of subtle forms of
racial discrimination. Awareness of these racial schemas, and the patterns of social interaction
that tend to be produced by these latent racialized ways of perceiving persons and situations, will
provide resources for situating facts into narrative frameworks, compelling stories persuasive to
finders of fact.
In order to craft this argument, I will endeavor to weave a tapestry that makes
connections between the current state of Title VII jurisprudence, some of the most interesting
proposals of legal scholars seeking to develop evidence on the basis of stereotypes and
identifiable patterns of subtle discriminatory behavior in the workplace, and recent theological
analyses of the origins of a racialized imagination within medieval European Christianity that
created white supremacy.
Part one of this essay will explore the complexities of Title VII racial discrimination
jurisprudence and the challenges faced by plaintiffs seeking to prove that they were singled out
and treated less favorably than others because of race or national origin. In this section, the
McDonnell-Douglas framework will be discussed and the development of sub-doctrines that
have made proving workplace discrimination extremely difficult.
The second portion of the essay will describe the claims and proposals of legal scholars,
including Charles Lawrence, III, Jerry Kang, and Linda Hamilton Krieger, who have been
advocates for implicit bias research in litigation. Krieger, as well as Susan Sturm, have
specifically applied implicit bias evidence to employment law. This segment of the essay will
also present the criticisms of “sympathetic critics” who share the goals of advocates of implicit
bias research, but who believe that the appeal to unconscious motives is both counterproductive
6

and unnecessary. It will argued that what is implicit is not necessarily unconscious if the
unconscious is defined as inaccessible to rational reflection and uncontrollable.
This section will conclude with the argument, which will set the stage for the rest of the
essay, that the most important insight, at least for employment discrimination litigation, of the
advocates of implicit bias is the recognition that implicit bias is actually the “internalization” of
culturally mediated stereotypes, racial classifications and other cultural tropes or schemas. 18
The third segment of this essay will explore Krieger’s appropriation of insights from
social cognition theory regarding processes of categorization, stereotypes, racial schemas, and
intergroup bias. Krieger’s ground-breaking argument, which is foundational to the argument of
this essay, is that, within second-generation racism, race, gender, and national origin most often
“make a difference,” not because of malicious intention to discriminate, but rather, because racial
schemas provide the proverbial “lenses” through which the decision-maker perceives persons
and employment-relevant events. Implicit racial, and other, biases shape what a decision-maker
“sees,” how she interprets it, the causes to which he attributes it, and what they remember and
forget.19
In order to make advance the central argument of this essay, it will be important, in the
fourth segment, to propose minor reformations of Title VII jurisprudence that are more generous
to plaintiffs. However, it is important to note that Title VII jurisprudence is not an entirely
consistent or coherent body of legal doctrine. There are trajectories within Title VII
jurisprudence that seem to define and limit impermissible discrimination to conscious

18 C HARLES TAYLOR, M ODERN SOCIAL I MAGINARIES (2003).
19 Joan C.

Williams et. al., Beyond Implicit Bias: Litigating Race and Gender Employment Discrimination Using
Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey, 72 94 H ASTINGS L.J. 337 (2020).Krieger, supra note 6, at 1179.
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discriminatory intent or motive. In other words, employers must be aware that they are motivated
by the employee’s protected characteristic, such as race, sex, or national origin. However, other
trajectories of Title VII jurisprudence have proven more capable of recognizing the role of subtle
discrimination and judgments of employees based upon stereotypes. Therefore, the minor
reformations that will be proposed are, in effect, advocacy that Title VII jurisprudence as a
whole embrace these developments and trajectories that are more compatible with the realities of
“second generation” racism. These proposed reformations include more flexible application of
the McDonnell-Douglas test and a softening of the distinction between direct and indirect
evidence in order that “stray remarks” giving expression to racial bias or stereotypes might be
accorded greater weight in the effort to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether
the plaintiff was a victim of employment racial discrimination.
In the fifth section of the paper, I will return to and develop the thesis of the essay. The
segment will begin with Robin Lenhardt that the category schemes and cognitive biases
described by Linda Hamilton Krieger are not neutral or innocent. Our categories and racial
schemas come from the social and historical context in which we find ourselves and result in
categorization that inflicts harm, producing hierarchies in which some persons and groups are
valued and others are excluded or stigmatized. 20 In this section, I begin to advance and develop
the argument that culturally pervasive racial schemas, stereotypes, attitudes, beliefs, and
legitimating ideologies, with deep roots in western history, provide some of the most important
resources for lawyers representing Title VII discrimination plaintiffs. To do so, this essay will
turn to sources rarely engaged in legal scholarship. Prior to Enlightenment racial “science,” the

20 R.A.

Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context , 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 827
(2004).
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idea of race emerged within western medieval and early modern Christianity. As western
European Christians encountered the non-white “other,” racial difference was mapped onto
religious difference to create a hierarchical imagination, a scale of human being with lighterskinned persons at the top of the hierarchy and dark skinned persons at the bottom of the scale.
Associated with white skin was superior intelligence, morality, and beauty. This racial hierarchy
functioned to legitimate slavery, domination, and colonial conquest. This racialized imagination
and racial aesthetic shaped the landscape of American society and law. In spite of the fact the
positive developments in American law and society in the 1960’s, which officially rejected the
avowed white supremacy that characterized American society for most of its history, a postracial social order did not miraculously spring into existence. The white supremacist social
imagination persists in multiple forms, from implicit bias, to explicit biases and stereotypes
believed by persons who, paradoxically, simultaneously believe in racial egalitarian ideals, and
in racism that may be concealed in polite company but explicitly articulated when persons
believe themselves to be out of earshot of persons who would disapprove.
The sixth segment of this essay will connect the white supremacist social imaginary that
had its origins in the western medieval Christian creation of race and a racial, hierarchical scale
of human being with the identification of multiple patterns of workplace bias by the Workplace
Experiences Survey (“WES”). Joan Williams, Rachel Korn, and Sky Mihaylo argue that the
WES provides a fine-grained description of how racial and gender bias play out in everyday
workplace interactions in pervasive and persistent patterns that are broadly recognized.
The final segment of this essay will offer a brief, suggestive look at how this approach
might serve lawyers through its application as a lens through which to interpret factual details
and craft a story of workplace discrimination.
9

Quick Methodological Notes
Much of the action in employment discrimination litigation takes place under state law,
which often is modeled after Title VII, and is adjudicated by a state agency, such as the
Department of Workforce Development’s Equal Rights Division in Wisconsin. However, this
essay will focus on Title VII and case law from federal courts.
This essay will restrict its focus to race discrimination. However, Title VII cases dealing
with sex discrimination will be integrated into the analysis when helpful
Note on Language
In order to write inclusively, I will intersperse pronouns and sometimes utilize he or his,
at other points she or her, and sometimes, they or their. When possible, I will refer to parties as
plaintiffs and decision-makers or defendants in order to use entirely gender neutral language.

I. Title VII: Discriminatory Treatment Jurisprudence: The Primary
Trajectory
Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 bans employment
discrimination, which pertains to adverse employment actions with respect to hiring, promotion,
compensation, discharge, or other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment because of a
person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22 The Supreme Court has asserted that there

21

Pub.L. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 255.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his comp ensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (West).
22

Title VII’s protections apply to employers with fifteen or more employees employment agencies, and labor unions.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c)(West).
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are only two causes of action under Title VII: (1) disparate treatment, which is intentional
discrimination, and; (2) disparate impact.23 Disparate treatment occurs where an employer has
treated a particular person less favorably than others because of a protected trait. A plaintiff must
establish that the employer had a discriminatory intent or motive for taking a job-related action.24
Disparate impact pertains to an employer’s facially neutral practices that are, in fact,
discriminatory in their operation and outcomes or effects.25 This essay will focus upon disparate
treatment claims for racial discrimination in employment.
The statutory language forbids adverse employment actions because of a person’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.26 The words “because of” do not offer much guidance on
what type of causation is required.27 Linda Hamilton Krieger points out that a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language would simply require proof of causation rather than proof
of motive. On this interpretation, a Title VII claimant would need only establish that his or her
protected status “made a difference” or “played a role” in the challenged employment decision. 28
Ambiguities and inconsistencies within Title VII jurisprudence have given rise to a
disagreement between legal scholars such as Krieger, on the one hand, and Michael Selmi, Joan
Williams, Sky Mihaylo, and Rachel Korn, on the other. While this issue will be addressed at

23

E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771 (2015).
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009).
25 Id. Disparate impact has been associated with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b)(West): It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer—
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, (1971), the Supreme Court first held that a plaintiff need not necessarily
prove intentional discrimination in order to establish that an employer has violated § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The evidence required in “disparate impact” cases usually focuses on statistical disparities and competing
explanations for such disparities rather than focusing on specific incidents.
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West):
27 Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 491 (2006).
28 Krieger, supra note 6, at 1168.
24 Ricci

11

greater length in the fourth section, it is important to identify the disagreement. On the one hand,
Krieger and Ann McGinley argue that the disparate treatment model is premised on the notion
that racial discrimination is motivational in character. Therefore, an employer accused of
discrimination must be consciously aware of their discriminatory behavior for the act to be
classified as intentional discrimination. In the stories told by disparate treatment case law,
Krieger argues, there is no discrimination without a villain, an invidiously motivated actor. 29
Justice Brennan gave voice to this trajectory of Title VII jurisprudence:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that,
if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or
employee was a woman.30
On the other side of the scholarly debate, Williams, Mihaylo, and Korn argue that
“intent” is a term of art in Title VII law that means that race or gender “has been taken into
consideration by the decision-maker, or that the employee’s protected trait entered the causal
chain.31 There is a line of case law that tends to interpret discriminatory intent as more
fundamentally a matter of causation rather than motivation. A prime example comes from a first
circuit case, Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., where the court stated,
[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that unlawful discrimination can stem from
stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus .... The
ultimate question is whether the employee has been treated disparately ‘because of race.’
This is so regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the
evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.32
However, regardless of whether a court considers discriminatory intent to be most
fundamentally motivational or causal, proving disparate treatment racial employment

29 Krieger,

supra note 6, at 1161, 1167; Ann C. McGinley, !viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII,. 94 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 417 (2000).
30 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
31 Williams et. al., supra note 19 at 403.
32 Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1999).
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discrimination is extremely difficult. On rare occasions, plaintiffs can prove, or at least attempt
to prove, impermissible disparate treatment through direct evidence of discrimination. This
requires evidence that so clearly and directly shows that an employment decision was made with
discriminatory intent that no inferences are required by the factfinder to conclude that the
employment decision was indeed discriminatory. 33
However, the direct method of proof is rarely available. First, few employers articulate
racial animus in an explicit fashion since doing so would guarantee defeat in an employment
discrimination lawsuit. Second, any effort to offer direct proof of discriminatory intent is
bedeviled by the fact that the mental states, motives or intentions, of employers are difficult, if
not impossible, to observe or prove directly.34 “There will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to
the employer’s mental processes.”35 Third, human behavior is complex and usually motivated by
many different factors. As Kerri Lynn Stone notes, the mind of a discriminatory decision-maker
is “a complex tapestry of unvoiced beliefs, assumptions and associations…… usually too tightly
woven to easily uncover and isolate the discrete strand of thought that clearly shows a
predisposition to see or judge certain groups differently. 36
A. McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine Burden-Shifting Framework
Since direct evidence is more often than not, difficult to come by or not available at all,
an employee in a protected group may offer indirect or circumstantial evidence that she or he
was been singled out and treated less favorably than others who are similarly situated. The
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green and Texas Dept. of

33 Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002); Simson, supra note 6, at 1112; Bornstein, supra note
11, at 960.
34 Simson, supra note 5, at 1072-73.
35 United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
36 Stone, supra note 10, at 592.
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Community Affairs v. Burdine37 provides a three-stage analytical framework for proving
intentional discrimination in situations where only circumstantial evidence is available.
A plaintiff alleging discrimination must first establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination requires proving (1) that she or he belongs to a protected class; (2) that she or he
was qualified for the position from which the person was terminated or the position the person
applied for; (3) that she or he suffered an adverse employment action; 38 (4) the plaintiff was
treated differently than someone outside of the protected class.39 The last requirement is
sometimes referred to as the requirement for “comparator” evidence. Sometimes, at least when
the adverse employment action is failure to hire or to promote, the prima facie case is
“established by proof that the employer, after having rejected the plaintiff’s application,
continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff's.40
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden of
production, though not the burden of proof, shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 41 Employers are almost always able to
present some facially plausible reason for firing or failing to hire or promote any particular
employee or applicant. After all, most employees are not perfect, make mistakes, or sometimes
show up to work late.

37

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 255, n. 8 (1981).
38 “Adverse employment actions” include termination, failure to hire, failure to promote, and sometimes, even a
negative performance evaluation, if the negative evaluation results in denial of a raise or additional income such as a
bonus.
39 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985-87 (1988); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; Walker v.
NationsBank of Fla., N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (11th Cir.1995).
40 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 530, (1993)(Souter Dissent).
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The ultimate burden of persuasion lies with the plaintiff, who must then rebut the
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons by proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the reasons offered by the defendant were not the true reasons, but a pretext for
discrimination. This burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has
been a victim of intentional discrimination. A plaintiff may succeed either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 42 A prime example
of this process is found in Jauregui v. City of Glendale. After Officer Jauregui, a Hispanic police
officer, established a prima facie case of discrimination, his employer, the City of Glendale,
California, argued that Officer Jauregui had not been promoted because he lacked strong
interpersonal relationship skills necessary for a supervisory position. However, Jauregui's
purported lack of interpersonal relationship skills were not included in his performance
evaluations. And, the comparator evidence initially presented in the effort to establish a prima
facie case also was relevant to establishing pretext. The city’s proffered non-discriminatory
reason was exposed as pretextual. The white police officer promoted over Officer Jauregui had

42 McDonnell Douglas

Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56. Linda Hamilton Krieger provides an
example of the effort to expose an employer’s proffered reason as pretextual. Her client, a Salvadoran, was
discharged. The employer claimed that his termination was because of tardiness, absence from work, and safety
violations. This required Krieger to obtain his attendance and disciplinary records in his employee file and compare
them with the records of his white co-workers to see if her client was treated differently. The effort to expose an
employer’s justification as pretextual might include, for example, evidence that the decision -maker undervalued or
ignored facts favorable to the employee or evidence that the decision -maker is not able to point to any specific
events that would reasonably support the decision-maker’s judgments about the plaintiff. Krieger, supra note 6, at
1179-80. See Chiponllini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 901 (3d Cir. 1987)(showing that the employer’s
justification of the plaintiff’s termination because of uncooperative behavior could not explain positive material in
plaintiff’s previous employment evaluations and was unable to offer specific examples of uncooperative behavior);
Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir. 1992)(holding that plaintiff may establish pretext by proving that
other employees who engaged in similar misconduct received less severe sanctions).
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lower scores on the objective examinations and his performance evaluation noted the officer’s
“lack of interpersonal relationship skills.”43
The Supreme Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters set forth what has been
described as a presumption of invidiousness.44 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated
that experience teaches that more often than not, people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner
without any underlying reasons. This, he suggests, is all the more true in a business setting.
Therefore, when all possible legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated, it
is more likely than not that the employer based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race.45
David Simson and Michael Selmi argue that the McDonnell-Douglas test was originally
premised upon the “baseline assumption” that discrimination is an explanatory variable because
of the continued prevalence of racial discrimination in the workplace. 46 Until 1993, a plaintiff,
relying upon the presumption of invidiousness, would, more likely than not, have succeeded on
the McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine test by successfully persuading the court that the employer’s
proffered non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was pretextual. 47
However, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks48 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc.
definitively moved the proverbial goal lines in a way that disadvantaged plaintiffs. The Supreme
Court rejected the notion that there should be a mandatory finding of discrimination when an

43 Jauregui

v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 1988).
supra note 6, at 1181.
45 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
46 Simson, supra note 5, at 1090; Selmi, supra note 6, at 328
47 There was confusion on this question and both a circuit split and contradictory conclusions within two circuits.
The court of appeals in the second, third, fifth, eighth and D.C. circuits held that a finding of pretext mandates
finding of illegal discrimination. Courts in the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth circuits held that a finding of pretext
does not mandate finding of illegal discrimination without more evidence. The sixth and eleventh circuits featured
divergent rulings on this question. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 512-13 (1993).
48 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 502.
44 Krieger,
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employee makes a prima facie case and then provides sufficient evidence that the employer’s
asserted non-discriminatory reason is not credible. In Hicks, the court held that proof that the
employer’s proffered reason is contrived does not compel judgment for the plaintiff that proof
does not in itself answer the ultimate question of whether the employer intentionally
discriminated. “It is not enough ... to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the
plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.” 49
The court in Reeves allows that it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation. But, if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, even if
the defendant gave a false explanation to conceal that nondiscriminatory, but perhaps
embarrassing reason, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. 50
In his dissent, Justice Souter defended the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting
framework “as it was” by asserting that this test was devised by the court to deal with
employment discrimination claims when only circumstantial evidence is available. He pointed
out the obvious dilemma in almost all disparate impact discrimination claims: There is seldom
eyewitness testimony regarding an employer’s “mental processes.” And employers who
discriminate are not likely to announce their discriminatory motive.. Justice Souter argued that
the majority’s scheme sets an almost impossibly high bar for Title VII plaintiffs without direct
evidence of discriminatory intent. Now, the plaintiff is now faced with the amorphous

49 Reeves
50 Reeves

530 U.S., at 146-47; Hicks, 509 U.S., at 511, 519, 524; Selmi, supra note 5, at 329.
530 U.S., at 147-48.
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requirement of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find
lurking in the record.”51
David Simson contends that Justice Souter’s dissent and the majority opinion in Hicks.
represent divergent assumptions about the extent of discrimination in the American workplace.
Justice Souter speaks of “common experience,” by which he means the ongoing realities of racial
and other discrimination. For Justice Souter, this common experience serves as a baseline
assumption. If an employer cannot credibly explain why they refused an employment benefit to a
non-white worker when the employer’s proffered reasons are exposed as implausible, then the
decision was more likely the result of racial discrimination. The majority, on the other hand, in
essence codified their very different baseline assumption that significant racial progress had been
made in the United States. Therefore, even if, for example, a qualified non-white applicant
applies and is rejected for an open position, the employer continues to search for other applicants
of similar qualifications and/or subsequently hires a white applicant who does not have superior
qualifications, and if the employer’s justification for hiring the white applicant or passing on the
non-white applicant is exposed as lacking credibility, a finder of fact still is not required to infer
that racial discrimination was the likely reason for the rejection of the black applicant. 52
Ralph Banks and Richard Ford point out the conflicting policy priorities of the dissent
and the majority. Justice Souter was motivated to protect the original purpose of the McDonnellDouglas framework, which was to protect employees from workplace discrimination. Since
discriminatory intent is hard to prove, the McDonnell-Douglas method offered a sensible, fair,

51 Hicks,

509 U.S., at 530-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Questioning The Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV 997, 998 (1994)(arguing that the Hicks decision was based on
the erroneous belief that discrimination is diminishing).
52 Simson, supra note 5, at 1089-90.
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and predictable way to uncover discrimination that employers had every incentive to hide.
Without direct evidence, the plaintiff’s only recourse is to prove discriminatory intent by a
process of elimination, which the McDonnell-Douglas method provided through a formal
structure and mandatory inference. Prior to Hicks, the plaintiff was not always required to
eliminate every possible nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, but only the reason
put forth by the defendant. Souter recognized that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion moved the
needle closer to a universal direct evidence requirement. The majority was extremely deferential
to employers, seeking to safeguard the employer’s prerogative to terminate the employment
relationship at will, thereby avoiding a de facto good cause obligation.53
Selmi, Ford, and Thompson argue that Justice Souter’s position would not, in fact, have
unfairly burdened employers. Practically speaking, the dissent's rule merely forces employers to
come forward with the actual reasons for their decisions. The employer is provided a chance to
explain suspicious behavior and, of course, has an obligation under oath to present accurate
testimony under oath. If the employer fails to do either, it is reasonable to assume the worst. If
the employer acted for bad but nondiscriminatory reasons, the employer should be required to
“fess up and face the jury” or to keep quiet and accept liability.54
Foster v. Dalton55 offers a paradigmatic example of the difficulties faced by plaintiffs
after Hicks and Reeves. The plaintiff, an African-American woman, was hired as a Professional
Affairs Coordinator, a civilian employee of the U.S. Navy. After her hire, a management analyst
position became available. Fearing that funding would not be available for this new position if it
remained open at the start of the next fiscal year, Commander William Travis decided not to hire

53 Ralph Richard

Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and
Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1076–80 (2009).
54 Banks and Ford, supra note 53, at 1079-80; Selmi, supra note 5, at 333.
55 Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1995).
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through the ordinary competitive hiring process and instead, did an internal, non-competitive
search. This involved assembling a list of potential qualified internal candidates. The plaintiff
best satisfied the job description requirements and was at the top of the list.56 After Travis was
presented with the list, with the plaintiff’s name on top, he had the job description re-written at a
lower grade.
Using the McDonnell-Douglas mechanism, after the plaintiff met her prima facie case.
Travis claimed that he hired Berry because he was the best available job candidate. The judge
did not believe his testimony. The plaintiff argued that it was only after the decision-maker
learned that the management analyst post would go to an African–American woman that he
adopted an alternative means of candidate selection. The plaintiff argued that the court's disbelief
of the explanation should have compelled an inference that the decision was race-driven.57
However, the district court concluded that Travis’s proffered reason was pretext, not for
impermissible discrimination, but because he was trying to cover up the fact that his decision
was cronyism. There was evidence in the record that Berry was his “fishing buddy” and that
Travis changed the job criteria so his friend would get the job. The court found this to be a
classic case of an old-boy network in operation. While cronyism is deplorable, the appellate
court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. An employer
can hire one person instead of another for any reason, fair or unfair, without violating Title VII.58

56 Id.,

at 54.

57 Id.
58 Id.,

at 55-56. The problem with the cronyism defense is that cronyism, even in the absence of direct discriminatory
motivation, typically assures unfair advantages to white workers and conversely, the denial of equal employment
opportunities to non-white workers. The court agreed, but stated that this argument is more appropriately brought
under a disparate impact claim. But the Catch-22 for the plaintiff-appellant is that a disparate impact claim would
have required her to persuade the trier of fact that pervasive cronyism infected multiple hiring decisions. But since
this hiring process was unique, a departure from the usual hiring protocols, there was no class of employment
decisions as is required for a disparate impact claim .
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This case illustrates the roadblocks faced by a plaintiff alleging a race discrimination
violation of Title VII using the McDonnell-Douglas test. While there was indeed evidence that
the decision-maker was motivated by cronyism, it is also entirely possible that Travis would not
have tweaked the job description to favor his “fishing buddy” if a white applicant had been on
the top of the initial list as the most qualified candidate. Racial bias may have been primary and
cronyism secondary, but without direct evidence of the inner workings of the mind of t he
decision-maker, the plaintiff could not have proven this to be the case. Prior to Hicks, the
plaintiff would have likely prevailed since the employer’s proffered reason was exposed as false.
B. Sub-Doctrines that Raise the Bar Higher for Title VII Plaintiffs: Stray Remarks,
Moment-of-Decision, and the Same Actor Doctrines
Title VII case-law tends to think about unlawful discrimination as the discriminatory
intent, or the employer’s state of mind, at the moment when the adverse employment decision is
made.59 Directly related to the “moment of decision doctrine is the “stray remarks doctrine.”
Isolated remarks that provide evidence of racial bias, prejudice, and stereotypical views of racial
minorities among decision-makers in the workplace are not deemed to be sufficient as direct
evidence of discriminatory intent unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant “actually
relied on racial stereotypes in making its decision. The logic of this doctrine is that prejudices
revealed in isolated remarks may not have been a factor in the adverse employment action.60
In Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the plurality observed that remarks at work based on, in
this case, sex stereotypes, “do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in the actual
employment decision. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on the
59 Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241, 250 (1989).
supra note 10, at 609-10. See, e.g., Knox v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 909 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (N.D. Ill.
1995)(asserting that “[e]vidence of a decision maker's occasional or sporadic use of stereotyped remarks or
derogatory comments about an employee's age or race is generally insufficient, without more, to establish a violation
of Title VII”).
60 Stone,
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person’s gender in making its decision.” The court allowed that stereotyped remarks can be
evidence that gender played a part, but not direct evidence that is decisive standing alone. 61
The stray remarks doctrine, in combination with the moment of decision doctrine, has
yielded outcomes that certainly seem absurd. In Heim v. State of Utah, a sex discrimination case,
the plaintiff-appellant argued that, on a mixed motives”62 analysis, she had showed direct
evidence of discriminatory intent due to an offensive comment made by her direct supervisor,
Mr. Tischner. In an angry outburst after Ms. Heim had problems with her work on ticket books,
Tichner’s remark was “[f]ucking women, I hate having fucking women in the office.” Shortly
after this outburst, Heim was refused permission to undertake a temporary field assignment, an
important professional development opportunity, for which she had previously been granted
permission. The court found that this offensive remark to be inappropriate and boorish, but
merely a statement of Tischner's private negative view of women during an angry emotional
outburst. The offensive remark was not found to be direct evidence of discriminatory intent with
respect to his treatment of Heim. A discriminatory intent to prevent Heim from her field
assignment might be inferred from the statement. As such, it would be permissible indirect
evidence within the McDonnell-Douglas framework. Citing Price-Waterhouse, the Heim court
concluded that a plaintiff must show that an employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decision. To this end, remarks based on sex stereotypes may be indirect evidence that sex or
gender played a part in the decision but do not inevitably prove that this is the case. 63

61 Price-Waterhouse,

490 U.S. at 228, 251 (1989). The court made the determination, in this particular case, that sex
stereotypes did in fact play an important part in the adverse employment action, that Price -Waterhouse relied upon
evaluations of the employee that were based upon sex stereotypes regard ing how a woman should act and dress.
62 A “mixed-motives” analysis will be discussed in the next section. The McDonnell-Douglas framework is
inapplicable to direct evidence.
63 Heim v. State of Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1993)(citing Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251). See also
Ramsey v. City & Cty. of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1990)(determining that statements of a supervisor,
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According to the same-actor doctrine, when a supervisor first behaves in a way that
benefits an employee and then subsequently takes adverse action against the same employee, the
supervisor's adverse treatment is presumptively nondiscriminatory. When it was originally
articulated by the fourth circuit in Proud v. Stone,64 the doctrine was deemed applicable only
when an employee was hired and fired by the same person within a relatively short time span.
The court in Proud reasoned that it is irrational to believe that animus exists in termination but
not hiring: “[i]t hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring
the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job.” 65
The “short time-span” has since been extended to over seven years. The logic supporting the
doctrine is that an employer or employer’s decision-maker who holds bias against members of a
stereotyped group would never have hired a member of such group (e.g., African Americans or
women) in the first place; therefore, a subsequent adverse decision cannot be discrimination. 66
While the same-actor doctrine has a certain logical appeal, there is evidence from
psychological research on moral credentialing and moral licensing that matters are more
complex. Victor Quintanilla and Cheryl R. Kaiser point to evidence that persons often feel more
comfortable behaving in biased, non-egalitarian ways when they can point to evidence
demonstrating previous lack of bias. After favoring a stereotyped group member, most majority
group members are less concerned with continuing to appear and behave in egalitarian or

who was widely known to have ideas about “women’s place” in the workforce, that certain jobs were more suitable
for women than others” did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination against the plaintiff).
64 Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991
65 Id. (quoting John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,
43 STAN. L. R EV. 983, 1017 (1991)).
66 Quintanilla & Kaiser, supra note 11, at 18-19; See e.g., Hobdy v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 386 F. App'x
722, 724 (9th Cir. 2010) (maintaining that since the principle was primarily responsible for both the hiring and
demotion of the plaintiff, “the defendants were entitled to the “same actor” inference, which creates a strong
inference that there was no discriminatory motive).
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unbiased ways. The initial unbiased decision serves as a moral credential in the face of a
subsequent decision that seems biased.67

C. Mixed Motives
Under a “mixed motives” analysis, a plaintiff need only establish that her race (or
membership in another protected class) was one of the employer’s motivations, a “motivating
factor,” for a particular adverse employment decision. There may have been other permissible
motivations in play. Therefore, race need not have been the “but for” cause of the decision. If the
plaintiff can make this showing, the employer is liable for disparate treatment discrimination.
But if the employer can show that it would have made the same decision, even in the absence of
the unlawful consideration of race, the plaintiff’s remedies can be limited to declaratory relief,
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.68
The breakthrough for plaintiffs in Price-Waterhouse is in the way the court interprets the
statutory language. The plurality opinion asserts that the words “because of” do not mean “solely
because of.”69 The court also stated that the McDonnell-Douglas framework is inapplicable
where a decision was a product of some combination of legitimate and illegitimate motives.
McDonnell-Douglas only applies to single-causation action. At issue is whether the “real” cause

67 Id.,

at 9-10.
Simson, supra note 5, at 1074. The court in Price-Waterhouse permitted an employer to avoid all liability if the
employer could prove that it would have made the same employment decision even if it had not allowed the
protected trait to play such a role. .Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S., at 244–45. In 1991, in response to the PriceWaterhouse decision, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so that employers can be found
liable if an impermissible factor played a motivating role in the employment decision, even if the employer would
have made the same employment decision in the absence of the impermissible factor. However, if the employer can
prove that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the impermissible factor, the employee cannot
recover da mages or gain reinstatement, hiring, or promotion. A plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees and receive
declaratory and injunctive relief. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999)). Thomas H. Barnard and George S. Crisci, “Mixed-Motive"
Discrimination Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Still a "Pyrrhic Victory" for Plaintiffs? , 51 M ERCER. L. R EV.
673, 673-74 (2000).
69 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S., at 240–41.
68
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of the adverse employment action was the employee’s membership in a protected class or the
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason proffered by the employer. Obviously, it makes no sense to
ask about the one “true reason” in a mixed-motives case.70
For the plaintiff to prevail and receive damages in a mixed motives cause of action, she
must make the case that, even though there may have been permissible motives in play, the
employer nonetheless would not have made the employment decision “but for” the employee’s
protected trait. The employer, on the other hand, must try to show that the same adverse
employment action would have been taken even in the absence of the illegitimate motive in order
to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff. 71
D. Title VII Jurisprudence and Race Discrimination: Concluding Remarks
David Simson points out that employment discrimination cases are difficult to win for
plaintiffs. Employment discrimination plaintiffs fare more poorly than other civil plaintiffs in
federal district courts. And if they succeed at the trial court level, there is a high likelihood that
their victories will be overturned on appeal. 72 Black plaintiffs bring the most employment race
discrimination cases and therefore, the anti-plaintiff bias of federal Title VII jurisprudence falls
disproportionately upon black plaintiffs.73 The irony is that one of the primary congressional
purposes in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to create lasting
improvements in the working conditions and equal employment opportunities of racial minority

70 Id.,

at 246-47.
supra., note 10, at 608-09.
72 Simson, supra., note 5, at 1037-38 (Referencing extensive statistical research conducted by Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? , 3 H ARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 103 (2009)); See also Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81
NOTRE DAME U.L. R EV. 889, 931-33 (2006).
73 Simson, supra note 5, at 1038
71 Stone,
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workers, especially African-Americans. In spite of the Supreme Court’s professed allegiance to
the congressional purposes behind Title VII, 74 actual Title VII race discrimination jurisprudence
in the federal courts is a game-board titled against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ chances of success are
slim even when they possess strong evidence of discrimination. The doctrines and case law
explored in this section have contributed to this morass.

II. The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Since the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the good news is that
approval for overt discriminatory attitudes and actions has diminished significantly. 75 Second
generation racism” was the term coined by Columbia Law professor Susan Sturm to describe 76
racism that is more subtle, suppressed, and implicit. The bad news, however, is that this kind of
discrimination is more difficult to prove.77 For example, Michael Selmi contends that
discrimination today is often the product of cumulative acts not traceable to a single actor or
event.78 Discrimination is expressed in small acts of disrespect or distrust. He provides a
hypothetical, though it is one based on the real experiences of far too many persons, of an
African-American who enters the workforce. Certain coworkers or supervisors may assume that
his job is the result of affirmative action. In their eyes, he is less qualified. Because of this subtle
bias, the employee is given fewer opportunities for professional development or fewer

Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986) (“[I]t was clear to
Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
have been traditionally closed to them,’ ... and it was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.” (alterations in original) (quoting United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
75
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. R EV. 1, 2 (2006);
Bornstein, supra note 12, at 929-30.
76 Sturm, supra note 12, at 460.
77 Bornstein, supra note 12, at 930.
78 Id.
74 Local 28,
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challenging assignments in the workplace. His work is carried out under a constant cloud of
suspicion. The employee is likely subjected to biased evaluations. In this situation, the employee
might react in different ways. He might work harder to prove himself, or he may begin to slack
off under the assumption that no matter what he does, he will not be given credit. If he were to
slack off, it will almost certainly be noticed and result in even poorer performance evaluations. If
the employee is terminated and files suit, and if the courts rely upon the “moment of decision
doctrine,” the court is likely to make the determination, at the summary judgment phase, that the
person was terminated for poor performance and discount his evidence of disrespect in the
workplace. The analytical tools that have developed in Title VII jurisprudence are inadequate to
identify discriminatory treatment during the entirety of the person’s employment, as well as
discrimination embedded in a business’s culture.79
A. Implicit Bias and the Implicit Association Test
Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Charles Lawrence, and associated with the
ongoing work Project Implicit and the Implicit Association Test (IAT), many legal scholars have
argued that courts should permit evidence of implicit bias in cases involving racial (as well as
sex/gender, disability, and national origin) discrimination cases. Lawrence identified the problem
with proving discriminatory intent with respect to “second -generation racism.” He noted that the
precedent established in Washington v. Davis required a plaintiff challenging the
constitutionality80 of a facially neutral law to prove discriminatory purpose on the part of those
enacting the law. Lawrence argued that such a:

79 Michael Selmi,

The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social
Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. R EV. 937, 940-41 (2014).
80 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In this case, two African-American applicants for police positions in
the District of Columbia Police Department were rejected on the basis of a written personnel test. They filed suit,
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motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often
impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute. Improper motives are
easy to hide. And because behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of motives,
governmental officials will always be able to argue that racially neutral considerations
prompted their actions.81
Drawing upon psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology, Lawrence argued that the
source of most racial harm now is found primarily in unconscious racist acts.82 Since implicit
bias is both pervasive and unconscious, many people, including those who are well-intentioned,
are unaware of the biases that influence their actions. Discrimination can occur even when the
person does not intend any discriminatory treatment.” 83
The measure of implicit bias that is most widely accessible and publicly known is the
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), which relies upon “response latency measures” that analyze
reaction times to stimuli. The IAT, debuted by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues in 1998,
measures the relative strength of associations between pairs of concepts through a series of
exercises in which participants are asked to sort concepts. According to Greenwald, The IAT is
intended to uncover “implicit bias” by measuring the strength of the association between social
categories (e.g., blacks or whites) and positive and negative attributes (e.g., “joy” and “love”
versus “agony” and “evil”). The foundational assumption is that when two concepts are highly
associated, the sorting task will be easier and require less time than when two concepts are not as
highly associated.84

alleging that the test, which functioned to exclude a disproportionate number of black applicants, was
discriminatory. This practice of a governmental body was challenged, not under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, but under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment since the police department in the District of
Columbia was a governmental body not governed by state law.
81 Lawrence, III, supra note 13, at 319.
82 Id., at 322-24.
83 Selmi, supra note 16, at 194.
84 Kirwin Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, Primer on Implicit Bias, 64-65, STATE OF THE SCIENCE :
I MPLICIT BIAS REVIEW, 2015, https://kirwa ninstitute.osu.edu/research/2015-state-science-implicit-bias-review (last
visited April 15, 2022); Banks & Ford, supra note 53, at 1060.
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The popular Black/White IAT analyzes the speed with which participants categorize
White and Black faces with positive and negative words. In this particular IAT, a participant uses
two keys to categorize faces as European American or African American. The participant then
does the same for words, categorizing each as “Good” or “Bad.” One key is then assigned to
“European American”/“Good” and the other to “African American”/“Bad” and a mixt ure of the
categorized faces and the words then appears, with the participant categorizing each. Finally, the
designations flip, with one key representing “African American”/“Good” and the other
“European American”/“Bad”. Someone who views white Americans more positively than black
Americans will be faster on the trials that have one button for white Americans and good words
and another button for black Americans and bad words, compared to trials that have one button
for white Americans and bad words and another button for black Americans and bad words. If a
participant more quickly sorts images and words when Black is paired with the negative attribute
and White with the positive attribute, compared to when the pairings are reversed, then the
participant is said to have an implicit bias against African Americans. Though other tests exist,
the IAT is the most respected and peer-reviewed.85
One of the key claims on the part of advocates of implicit bias research is that implicit
biases are widespread and operate largely beneath the radar of human consciousness.86 Implicit
associations we harbor in our subconscious cause us to have feelings and attitudes about other
people based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, and appearance. Generally, our
implicit biases tend to favor our own in-group, though persons can hold implicit biases against

85 Kirwin
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their own in-group. 87 One of the key claims is that implicit biases are not accessible through
introspection and therefore, are different from known biases that individuals may choose to
conceal to avoid social disapproval. According to the advocates of implicit bias research,
because implicit bias is an automatic and unconscious process, people who engage in this
unthinking discrimination are not aware of the fact that they do it.”88
Because our implicit associations arise outside of our conscious awareness, they do not
necessarily align with our declared beliefs or stances we would explicitly endorse. 89 Many
individuals who claim to believe in egalitarian ideals with respect to race or sex and gender, for
example, have high measures of implicit bias as measured by the IAT. 90 This discrepancy is
what has led implicit bias researchers to posit that individuals are often unaware of their biases.91
B. Critiques of the Utilization of Implicit Bias in Title VII Racial Discrimination
Litigation
Implicit bias and social framework theory have been utilized primarily in class action and
disparate impact cases. Social framework theory posits that where workplace statistics show
discrimination and workplace policies are likely to activate implicit bias, an employer entity
intentionally discriminates by failing to prevent or correct for the implicit biases of its individual
decision makers.92 After some initial success, the momentum of implicit bias evidence has been
stalled by several decisions of the Roberts court, especially Ricci and Wal-Mart v. Dukes. In
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88 Id. at 62.
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these cases, the Court narrowly circumscribed the use of “social framework” evidence. 93 In
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, social framework theory was rejected as a means to satisfy the commonality
requirement necessary to sustain a class action under Rule 23. 94
Appeals to implicit bias are problematic for other reasons. Since implicit bias has been
theorized as unconscious, pervasive and uncontrollable, Michael Selmi argues, labeling
discrimination as implicit bias is likely to place it beyond legal reach and making discrimination
more, rather than less, difficult to prove since governing legal standards often turn on one’s
ability to control one’s behavior. 95
Ralph Banks and Richard Ford and have argued that the results of the IAT are ambiguous
because the IAT is unable to distinguish and disentangle implicit from conscious bias. Because
of the widespread disavowal of racism in the wake of the civil rights era, a large percentage of
persons in our society, including, presumably research participants, are unwilling to openly
express views considered to be explicitly racist. This means that obtaining an accurate measure
of conscious bias, against which to compare unconscious bias, is extraordinarily difficult. 96
Michael Selmi agrees. Since much of the implicit bias research explores the discrepancies
between self-reported attitudes and the implicit biases exposed by the IAT, the question is
whether self-reported attitudes about race, sex and gender, sexuality, and disability reflect a
person’s actual explicit beliefs or whether self-reported beliefs reflect social norms, and fear of
social disapproval.97 Selmi contends that:

93 Id.,

at 922.
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354-55 (2011) (declaring that the expert testimony on social
framework did “nothing to advance [plaintiff's] case” and the Court could “safely disregard it”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23;
Williams, et al, supra note 19, at 343.
95 Selmi, supra note 16, at 195, 197-98.
96 Banks and Ford, supra note 53, at 1063-64.
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people may not be more biased than they realize but…they are more biased than they are
willing to admit. If that is the case, there is no obvious reason why such bias would be
labelled implicit rather than explicit, and implicit bias measures might be revealing
concealed beliefs rather than unconscious ones.98
Banks and Ford point to studies that have shown that the degree of correlation between
implicit and explicit attitude measures depends partly on the strength of social norms with
respect to the group or practice at issue. For example, researchers have found a higher correlation
between implicit and explicit attitudes toward being a vegetarian (a socially acceptable practice)
than toward smoking (a more stigmatized practice). Participants' implicit and explicit attitudes
were more highly correlated when judging Islamic fundamentalists in the years following
September 11, 2001, than when judging Jews in a social context in which anti-Semitism is
strongly disapproved.99 The fact that the strength of the correlation between explicit attitudes as
self-reported and unconscious bias as measured by the IAT depends upon social desirability
pressures is significant. It suggests that the divergence may be at least partly a consequence of
the understatement of conscious views. When research participants feel free to express negative
views openly, as in the case of Islamic fundamentalists, implicit and explicit measures are more
highly correlated than when there are social pressures to withhold negative sentiments.100
Joan Williams, Rachel Korn, and Sky Mihaylo contend that appeals to IAT and implicit
bias are not particularly useful for employment law. The IAT, which focuses on the milliseconds
that measure how stereotypes affect automatic associations, is a source of insight regarding
matters such as police use of lethal force, where making a rapid decision is required. But in the
workplace, different cognitive processes are in play. Workplace decision making proceeds at a
slower pace. Workers, for example, regularly override initial instincts and self-edit to conform to
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workplace norms. Few of us blurt out that we think our boss is an idiot or a colleague is sexy.
We are capable of providing a cognitive override. Stereotype activation may be automatic, but
stereotype application is controllable.101
C. Discarding Theories of Unconscious Racism
Michael Selmi correctly argues that implicit bias should be distinguished from, rather
than equated with, unconscious bias.102 Courts are unlikely to hold employers liable for what is
unconscious and uncontrollable. In addition, if implicit bias is simply omnipresent, almost all
employment decisions are tinged with bias. This may or may not be the case, but it is too broad
of a principle to inform judicial discernment. 103
There is no consensus within the discipline of psychology regarding the nature of the
unconscious mind and its relationship to the conscious mind. In the words of John Bargh and
Ezequiel Morsella, “different operational definitions lead to dramatically different conclusions
about the power and scope of the unconscious.”104 Judges are not equipped to adjudicate between
divergent theoretical accounts of the unconscious mind. While there are good grounds for
believing that the IAT reliably identifies what is properly characterized as implicit bias.
However, the precise nature and “location” of the “implicit” in the human mind or psyche or
neurological system is more difficult to pinpoint with precision. For example, while
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discriminatory behavior may not be entirely at the forefront of a person or group’s selfawareness, this does not mean it should be located in the Freudian unconscious. Persons may
have a tacit awareness of their biases which shape their perceptions and behavior. Tacit bias may
not at the forefront of their consciousness, but this does not necessarily mean it is entirely
unconscious or uncontrollable. Persons may operate with stereotypes that have not been
subjected to examination. But what is tacit or latent, what is not at the forefront of self consciousness, may not be unconscious in the sense of being inaccessible if a person engages in
self-reflection.
Though anecdotal, a prime example of this dynamic is one in which most white persons
have engaged. A person is driving in an urban area and begins to see more African-American, or
perhaps Hispanic, persons in yards and on sidewalks. The person, without thinking, instinctively
locks his or her car doors. While this may be implicit bias in action, is it really unconscious?
Most persons who do this would be, perhaps, embarrassed to admit it, but most could easily
acknowledge that they perceived the presence of black or Hispanic persons as potentially
dangerous. It is doubtful that the person who may have “unthinkingly” and “instinctively” locked
the car doors would really have no conscious clue as to why they did so. Implicit bias may be on
the periphery of conscious awareness, but this does not mean it is located in an unconscious
sphere of the person’s mental processes that is inaccessible to conscious reflection.
D. Two Indispensable Contributions of Implicit Bias Legal Scholarship
There are two major contributions of the advocates of implicit bias research in legal
scholarship that are indispensable to the argument in this essay. First, Linda Hamilton Krieger’s
groundbreaking argument is that much discrimination occurs, not because decision-makers are
motivated by animus, but because cognitive biases and racial categorization schemas provide the
34

lens through which decision-makers perceive and evaluate employees and workplace realities.
Cognitive racial biases distort the decision-maker’s perceptual and inferential processes,
adversely influencing how information is interpreted, the causes to which events are attributed,
and how events are encoded into, retained in, and retrieved from memory. Race, gender, or
national origin often make a difference in an adverse employment action, not because the
employer intended to take the person’s protected class into account to the detriment of the
person, but due to these interpretive distortions.105
Second, what Charles Lawrence and Jerry Kang propose, in effect, is that what has been
internalized as implicit bias is that which comes to us from the “outside” as culturally mediated
stereotypes, racial classifications, racial schemas,106 and other cultural tropes. In the second half
of this essay, it will be argued that the direction in which these advocates of implicit bias should
be followed is not inward, to the unconscious, but outward, in order to discern racial bias present
within the social imagination passed along from generation to generation.
III. Linda Hamilton Krieger: Categorization, Intergroup Bias, and Social Cognition
Theory
Linda Hamilton Krieger’s groundbreaking essay, “The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,” was a bold
effort to propose a paradigm shift for Title VII jurisprudence. Krieger’s thesis is that most
second-generation employment racial discrimination occurs because cognitive intergroup biases
distort the lenses, the interpretive framework, through which employers and employer’s
decision-makers perceive an employee and workplace realities. Krieger argues that “[a]n
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employee's group status may have affected the decision-maker in completely non-conscious
ways by affecting what he saw, how he interpreted it, the causes to which he attributed it, what
he remembered, and what he forgot.107
Krieger’s proposal is designed to combat the problems with Title VII jurisprudence as
she interprets it. Under current doctrine, she argues, we must either find that the decision-maker
intended to discriminate or that no discrimination occurred . A finding of disparate treatment
discrimination requires evidence that the employer or the employer’s decision-making agent
possesses transparency of mind and is fully aware of the reasons for their decision. A
discriminatory decision-maker must choose to discriminate by consciously including the
employee’s group status into the judgmental calculus. The employer may be motivated by
antipathy toward the person’s race or other protected class, desiring to exclude such persons
from employment in the business in question, or she may make decisions on the basis of
stereotypes, treating the person’s group status as a “proxy” for some other job-relevant trait. For
example, an employer may have a stereotype of Hispanic males as lazy. When a highly qualified
Hispanic male applicant applies for the job, the employer does not hire him because he believes
he will not be a hard worker. Therefore, Title VII jurisprudence, she argues, is based on the
assumption that well-intentioned decision-makers are able “not to discriminate,” while illintended decision-makers know they are discriminating on the basis of the employee’s
membership in a protected class. When challenged, ill-intentioned decision-makers fabricate
“pretexts,” that is, lies, to cover their tracks.108
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In her essay, Krieger offers an extensive account of developments in social cognition
theory since the 1950’s that illuminate the dynamics of categorization and intergroup bias.
Categorization is interpreted by social cognition theory as part of normal human cognitive
functioning. Categorical structures simplify the perceptual environment by transforming “fuzzy”
differences into clear-cut distinctions. Because complexity threatens the stability of our
categorical structures, categorical thinking generates the tendency towards thinking that “all ‘x’s’
are alike. Humans often create “mental prototypes” of a typical category member. We carry in
our heads an image of the “typical chair,” the “typical law school professor,” and “the typical
drug dealer.” Cognitive psychologists refer to these categorical structures as “schemas.” We
experience the objects, and persons we encounter, first as members of some basic category, the
category most accessible at the moment of perception or encounter. 109
Krieger describes a significant body of research illuminating the nature of intergroup
bias. Experimental data indicates that when persons are divided into groups, even on a trivial or
random basis, strong biases in their perception of differences result. As soon as the concept of
“groupness” is introduced, subjects perceive members of their group as more similar to
themselves, and members of other groups as more different from themselves, than when those
same persons were simply viewed as non-categorized individuals. Experimental subjects also
consistently evaluated in-group members more favorably than out-group members. Subjects
were also better able to recall undesirable behavior of out-group members than similar behaviors
among in-group members. They disproportionately attributed in-group members' failures to
situational factors and out-group members' failures to dispositional factors.110

109 Id.

at 1189-90.
at 1191-92 (referencing research by Henri Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, & Claude Flam ent, Social
Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 154 -55 (1971); see also John W. Howard
110 Id.,

37

Krieger affirmed Henri Tajfel’s argument that intergroup bias was is not necessarily
motivational in origin, but rather, is the result of the same processes of categorization,
assimilation, and search for coherence that underlies all human cognition, whether the objects
judged be persons of different races or objects assigned to different groups. As such, intergroup
bias is “a natural, automatic, and inevitable aspect of imperfect learning about the individual
members of overlapping groups.”111
How does this play out in the real world? Persons tend to perceive out-group members as
being homogeneous, almost as an undifferentiated mass, while in-group members are viewed as
similar in whatever are the most relevant features, but nonetheless,, are seen as more
differentiated than out-group members are recognized to be. For example, Krieger narrated the
story of a race discrimination case she litigated. Her client was Salvadoran, but the plant
manager described him as “Mexican,” which was evidence that he perceived Latinos as an
undifferentiated out-group.112
These same cognitive structures and processes result in stereotypes. Social cognition
theory regards stereotypes, like other categorical structures, as cognitive mechanisms that all
people use to simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information. However,
once in place, stereotypes operate as “social schemas, As such, they “bias” the perception,
interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people. These biases are
more fundamentally cognitive rather than motivational. They operate even in the absence of any
intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group. As such, they bias a decision-
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maker’s judgment long before the moment of decision. Finally, when operating as schemas,
stereotypes are beyond the reach of a decision-maker’s self-awareness. As such, cognitive bias
may be unintentional and unconscious.113 When majority group members do not have much
contact with an outgroup of minority group members, negative behaviors become salient, that is,
they stand out to the perception of a majority group member. Negative stereotypes shape what
we expect to see. Operating as “correlational expectancies,” stereotypes and racial schemas
distort incoming information about members of different social groups. As such, they lead
persons to unintentionally “screen out,” and thereby insulate themselves from, disconfirming
evidence; i.e., positive behaviors that we do not expect to see.114
To summarize Krieger’s argument, cognitive sources of inter-group bias distort the
interpretive framework through which employees, their work, and their interactions are
perceived, thereby distorting the decision-making process. Stereotyped racial categories and
schemas affect perception, what the employer saw and didn’t see, how she interpreted it, the
causes to which he attributed it, what they remembered, and what they forgot, thereby distorting
the decision-maker’s perceptual and inferential processes. In other words, decision-making is not
distinct from processes of perception, memory, and interpretation that relevantly shape decisions.
Cognitive forms of intergroup bias affect decision-making at all points along a perceptual
/inferential/ judgmental continuum. This means that race, gender, or national origin make a
difference in the adverse employment action, even in the absence of invidious motivation or
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discriminatory animus. This calls into question, Krieger argues, the body of Title VII case-law
that looks to the employer’s state of mind, at the moment when the adverse employment decision
is made. Her thesis is that Title VII jurisprudence is almost completely unable to respond to
second-generation racism. The question is whether Title VII jurisprudence is, or has to be, as
inflexible as it is in Krieger’s narrative. 115

Ambiguities, Positive Trajectories, and Possibilities of Reformation of Title
VII Case Law
As noted in the previous section, Krieger has argued that disparate treatment
jurisprudence is flawed because it is premised on the notion that racial discrimination, as well as
discrimination on the basis of other protected classes, is construed by the courts as motivational
in character.116 There is a significant volume of case law supporting Krieger’s description of
Title VII jurisprudence. Disparate treatment is consistently described as “intentional
discrimination.”117 In a case in the eighth circuit, the court maintained that a showing by the
plaintiff that he was treated differently than other employees is insufficient. Rather, the court
held that the plaintiff must show that the employer intentionally discriminated against him
because of his race.118 A fourth circuit decision stated that “[d]iscriminatory intent means actual
motive.”119 In EEOC v. Flasher Co., the court in the tenth circuit asserted that “merely finding
that people have been treated differently stops short of the crucial question: why people have
been treated differently.”120 Title VII prohibits only intentional discrimination based upon an

115

Id., at 1161, 1167, 1182-85. 1199, 1213.
at 1161, 1167, 1170.
117 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981).
118 Smith v. Honeywell, Inc., 735 F.2d 1067, 1068–69 (8th Cir. 1984).
119 Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 751–52 (4th Cir. 1986).
120 E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992).
116 Id.,

40

employee's protected class characteristics. 121 A district court case, Gomez v. Medical College, took
this logic to its extreme, holding that o nly a finding that discrimination was the motive, the sole

reason for adverse action will impose liability on the employer."122
Nonetheless, Michael Selmi, Joan Williams, and others argue that this is a
misunderstanding of the meaning of “intentional discrimination.” Intentional discrimination does
not necessitate that an employer had a self-conscious intent to discriminate against an employee
in a protected class and then engaged in a cover-up to hide that nefarious intent. Rather, Joan
Williams and her colleagues argue, “intent” is a term of art in Title VII law. It means that race,
gender or other protected class status has been taken into consideration by the decision-maker or
that the employee’s protected trait entered the causal chain.123 Michael Selmi adds that the
concept of intent is only tangentially related to animus or illicit motive. In defining intentional
discrimination, the issue is not what the decision-maker subjectively intended, but rather,
whether the record permits an inference that an impermissible factor, such as race or sex, was the
impetus for the adverse employment action. 124
Stephanie Bornstein argues that “intentional” disparate treatment is a flexible concept of
judicial design and interpretation.125 An example is found in a seventh circuit decision, Lust v.
Sealy. After the plaintiff, a woman, had expressed interest in a promotion that would have
required her to relocate, her supervisor did not recommend her for the position because he did
not think she would want to relocate her family, in spite of the fact that she never told him she
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was unwilling to relocate. The Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 126
Bornstein points out that Lust’s supervisor did not intend to disadvantage her because she was a
woman. In other words, his intent was not to discriminate against her because of her membership
in a protected class.127 But her supervisor acted on the basis of a stereotype. Judge Posner even
gave his opinion that the stereotype is on average more often true than not. He opined that “the
average mother is more sensitive than the average father to the disruptive effect of moving to
another city upon children. However, he noted that antidiscrimination laws entitle employees to
be evaluated as individuals rather than “as members of groups having certain average
characteristics.”128 Even though her supervisor did not intend to discriminate against the plaintiff
and disadvantage her because she was a woman, this is still a case of discriminatory treatment
involving “intent.” The supervisor intended to act upon his views that were related to her class
membership as a woman with a family. This consideration entered into the causal chain and
resulted in discriminatory consequences.129
The reforms that are needed in Title VII jurisprudence are already part of the stream of
Title VII jurisprudence. What is needed is for these jurisprudential tendencies and trajectories to
be moved to the forefront so that plaintiffs have the opportunity to offer the full panoply of
evidence available to them. Perhaps the most interesting cases, and the most promising as a
trajectory for reform of Title VII jurisprudence is a ninth circuit case, EEOC v. Inland Marine
Indus., and a first circuit case, Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., along with Lust v. Sealy.
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The court in Inland Marine stated that “the essence of disparate treatment is different
treatment. Subjective wage-setting criteria resulted in a situation in which no black employee
ever earned more than any white worker. This disparate wage structure had slowly evolved over
time, but when black workers made management aware of it, the company did not correct the
disparities. When notified, the owner raised the wages of the complaining black workers twentyfive cents an hour, but this did not result in wages equivalent to similarly situated white workers.
The owner confined the raises to the persons who complained and made no attempt to institute
across-the-board changes to correct systemic wage inequity. Inland Marine argued that the
complaint should have alleged disparate impact instead of disparate treatment. However, the
district court maintained and the appellate court agreed that this was indeed a disparate treatment
case because it was a case in which the company treated black employees differently from the
way it treated white employees. In making this judgment, the court demonstrated a more flexible
account of discriminatory intent. The court maintained that the discrimination was subtle, that
Inland Marine had discriminated without malice, but that the discrimination was intentional
because the owner failed to act to rectify the disparities for all black employees. Nor was the fact
that there was no malicious scheme to pay black workers less than white workers necessary to
determine that there was intentional discrimination. The court stated, instead, that while racial
discrimination today (in 1984) often wears a benign mask, current practices that perpetuate racial
disparities may hide subconscious attitudes.130
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co. represents the direction in which Title VII jurisprudence
should evolve. The court demonstrated the ability to adapt to the complexities of second
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generation racism and, as will be pointed out, the ability to adjust its proof structures or
analytical frameworks to the particular facts of the case
Thomas had been regarded as an exemplary employee, praised by her managers and
customers alike, in her position of customer service representative. She received excellent
performance evaluations until she was assigned to a new supervisor after her tenth year of
employment. Flannery, the new manager, tried to sabotage Thomas by damaging her
professional standing with customers. On one occasion, Flannery came to a customer training
session to observe Thomas at work and instead, took over the session and conducted the training
herself. On another occasion, Flannery attempted physically to block Thomas from leaving a
meeting which had been scheduled at the same time as an important training session for one of
Thomas's customers. And whereas Thomas had regularly received the highest ratings, of 5 and 6,
on her performance reviews, Flannery regularly gave her 2’s and 3’s for the same categories of
job performance. Because Kodak used a performance appraisal ranking system, Thomas was laid
off during a workforce reduction because of her low performance evaluation scores. 131
The court held that an employee has been treated disparately “because of race” regardless
of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race or simply did so
because of unthinking stereotypes or biases. Subjective evaluations can easily mask covert or
unconscious discrimination on the part of predominantly white managers. The court quoted with
approval a statement of the D.C. Circuit court in Hopkins v. Price-Waterhouse:
In keeping with [Title VII's remedial] purpose, the Supreme Court has never applied the
concept of intent so as to excuse an artificial, gender-based employment barrier simply
because the employer involved did not harbor the requisite degree of ill-will towards the
person in question. As the evidentiary framework established in McDonnell Douglas
makes clear, the requirement[ ] of discriminatory motive in disparate treatment cases
131 Id.,
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does not function as a “state of mind” element, but as a method of ensuring that only
those arbitrary or artificial employment barriers that are related to an employee or
applicant's race, sex, religion, or national origin are eliminated. 132
The Thomas court further aligned with the D.C. Circuit in Price-Waterhouse in its argument that
disparate treatment doctrine focuses on causality rather than conscious motivations:
unwitting or ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication than blatant or
calculated discrimination…….If the plaintiff has shown that she was treated less
favorably because of her gender, the fact that some or all of the partners at Price
Waterhouse may have been unaware of that motivation, even within themselves, neither
alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it.133 .
The Thomas court also argued that the Supreme Court has recognized that unlawful
discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other kinds of cognitive biases. In Washington v.
Gunther, the court appealed to its “past interpretations of Title VII as “prohibit[ing] all practices
in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.”134 The court then added, “In forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 135
First and foremost, the most fundamental reform would be that of treating this line of
case law as paradigmatic of theTitle VII jurisprudence that is needed to account for secondgeneration racism that is subtle because it is tethered to stereotypes and other cognitive biases.
Second, the distinction between direct and indirect evidence is more elusive than
typically imagined. Direct evidence is defined as, in effect, “smoking gun” evidence requiring no
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inferences by the factfinder to conclude that the employment decision was discriminatory.136
Defined as such, almost all evidence is indirect. In Brown v. East Mississippi Electric Power
Ass’n, the plaintiff presented evidence that the decision-maker routinely used racial slurs and had
directly referred to Brown as a n****.137 The district court decision, which was prior to Desert
Palace v.Costa,138 denied Brown the option of proceeding under a mixed -motives theory,
treating his supervisor’s abusive racial language as indirect evidence of discrimination. Since
Brown could not disprove each of the employer’s proffered reasons at the third stage of the
McDonnell-Douglas analysis, the employer prevailed at the summary judgment phase. On
appeal, the court overturned the decision, determining that the racial slurs constituted direct
evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor in the adverse action against Brown.139
The problem, as Linda Krieger points out, is that, given the definition of direct evidence
mentioned above, Brown’s evidence really was indirect and circumstantial evidence. While a
supervisor’s use of vicious racial slurs is highly significant, it nonetheless requires an inference
that the supervisor allowed his racial animus to determine his employment decision.140 Brown
lost at the district court level because the McDonnell-Douglas test functioned as a straight-jacket
which marginalized the incredibly persuasive evidence he presented. Subsequent developments,
which will be described, would have benefitted Brown at the district court level and enabled him
to survive a summary judgment motion.
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What is needed is to relax the rigid distinction between direct and indirect evidence and
the rigid dichotomy between McDonnell-Douglas’s single cause assumption and a mixedmotives cause of action.
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme Court held that in a mixed-motive cause of
action, a plaintiff is not required to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a
mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.141 Instead, the court held that a plaintiff need only present sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” In holding
that direct evidence was not required for a plaintiff to bring a so-called mixed-motive claim, the
Court essentially did away with the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence in the
context of determining the proper analytical framework to apply.142 In Desert Palace, the court
addressed a circuit split based upon divergent interpretations of Price-Waterhouse.
Professor Kerri Lynn Stone argues that confusion has persisted in the courts in the
aftermath of Desert Palace, but she contends the most courts agree that a plaintiff seeking to
establish discrimination may proceed either directly, by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly, by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Where the confusion lies is in the
distinction between the direct and indirect methods of proof, on the one hand, and the distinction
between direct and indirect, or circumstantial evidence. The direct method of proof does not
require only direct evidence. Hence, a plaintiff using the direct method of proof may present
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direct and indirect evidence which together, must be sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof.
While some courts have erroneously conflated the direct method of proof and direct evidence,
the approach most consistent with Costa was articulated by the court in McGinest v. GTE Service
Corp. The court stated that the decision in Costa gives plaintiffs the option to use the
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework at the summary judgment stage. However,
parties are not required to use this test. Plaintiffs also have the option simply to produce direct or
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not
motivated the employer.143
The courts in McGinest and in Burton v. Town of Littleton offer a simplified analytical
framework that prevents plaintiffs from the proverbial straight-jacket of the McDonnell-Douglas
framework when that framework would be an impediment to a presentation of the evidence that
supports the plaintiff’s case. As Kerri Lynn Stone argues, the outcome is an approach in which
the plaintiff must simply present enough evidence to permit a finding that there was differential
treatment in an adverse employment action that was caused, at least in part, by a forbidden type
of bias. The issue, then, is the sufficiency of the evidence, not its classification. 144
Bostock v. Clayton Cty. is a positive development because it frees plaintiffs from the rigid
dichotomy of having to choose either: (1) the route of proving that their membership in a
protected class was the sole reason for their mistreatment, governed by the McDonnell-Douglas
test, or; (2) a mixed-motives cause of action with the attendant risk of the sharp limitation on

143 McGinest

v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); See also Burton v. Town of Littleton, 426
F.3d 9, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2005 (following Costa and maintaining that any evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
may be amassed to show, by preponderance, discriminatory motive.”).
144 Stone,

supra note 10, at 612-13.

48

damages governed by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 145 In Bostock, the
court insisted that Title VII’s “because of” test incorporates the simple and traditional standard of
“but-for causation.” However, the court maintained that events often have more than one “but for” cause and if the adverse employment action would not have happened “but-for” the person’s
protected class status, then the employer has committed impermissible discrimination. An
employer cannot avoid liability by claiming that other causes also influenced his or her adverse
employment action so long as the plaintiff’s protected status was a “but-for” cause. If the
employer would not have terminated or demoted or refused to hire if, for example, the employee
or job applicant was white instead of Hispanic, then the person’s race was a “but-for” cause even
if other considerations came into play.146
Finally, in reforming Title VII jurisprudence, it is important to avoid falling into the trap
of treating the McDonnell-Douglas method as rigid, mechanized or ritualistic, an error the court
in Furnco cautioned against.147 Thomas v. Eastman Kodak is a paradigm of jurisprudential
flexibility to accommodate racial discrimination complaints that do not conform to a rigid
application of the McDonnell-Douglas framework with respect to pretext analysis. One of the
prime limitations of the McDonnell-Douglas framework has been its treatment of racial
discrimination on a “single-motive” model. At the third stage of the analysis, the question is
whether the employer discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff’s protected class or whether the
employer’s proffered reason is a dishonest attempt to hide their true, discriminatory motives.
However, this pretext analysis lacks the analytical tools to easily identify discrimination in the
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form of cognitive biases. A biased decision-maker’s proffered reason may be one the decisionmaker believes but in fact, was the result of biased evaluation of the employee or applicant.
The court in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co. recognized that the disparate treatment that
Thomas, the plaintiff, alleged was more subtle than forms of discrimination more easily
detectible with the McDonnell-Douglas framework. In this case, Thomas did not claim that
Kodak, her employer articulated a false reason for her termination and that the company’s
proffered reason was a lie designed to disguise the racial animus that was the “real reason.” The
employer terminated Thomas because of her more recent low performance evaluations. But
Thomas challenged the race neutrality of the evaluator and argued that her low performance
evaluations were themselves the disparate treatment leading to her termination, not because her
supervisor was lying to cover up explicit racial animus, but rather, because her supervisor was
biased and that bias distorted her perception of Thomas’s performance.148
In a footnote, the court in McDonnell-Douglas stated that because facts vary in Title VII
case, the prima facie proof required is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations.149 This footnote is significant because courts often treat the McDonnellDouglas test rigidly as a threshold requirement for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination.150 .Bornstein points to a positive development for plaintiffs alleging other forms
of Title VII discrimination in a line of caregiver and transgender cases in which courts have
allowed plaintiffs with sex stereotyping evidence to create an inference of discrimination even
when they lack comparators. 151 In Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, a 2nd
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circuit decision, a sex stereotyping plaintiff succeeded without a comparator in a field impacted
by occupational segregation. The plaintiff was a school psychologist who, after she had a child,
experienced declining performance evaluations, resulting in her unexpectedly being denied
tenure. The court rejected the defendant school's argument that she should lose on summary
judgment unless she could produce evidence of “similarly situated men” that the school had
treated better than her. Requiring a male comparator would have proven difficult or even
impossible since the plaintiff was the only school psychologist and 85% of the school's teachers
were women, 71% of whom were mothers. According to the court, “stereotypical remarks about
the incompatibility of motherhood and employment” made by the female decision makers who
denied her tenure was evidence enough that “‘gender played a part’ in [the] employment
decision.” Thus, the court held, “stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without
more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.”152
All of these proposed reforms represent strands or trajectories already operative in at least
some federal circuits. But if: (1) the rigidity in application of the McDonnell-Douglas framework
is relaxed in response to the unique circumstances of each case; (2) if intentional discrimination
is recognized to include employment decisions infected by stereotypes or other cognitive biases,
and; (3) if the plaintiff is simply permitted to make their case by presenting sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, without having
indirect evidence marginalized by the stray remarks doctrine, the impediments to race
discrimination plaintiffs described in the first segment of this essay will be minimized.
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V. The Theological Formation of Race
Robin Lenhardt agrees that humans constantly and unconsciously try to “fit experience
into some interpretive scheme” in the effort to achieve some meaningful ordering of our
world.153 However, Lenhardt points out that categorization is not innocent or neutral. The
operation of stereotypes and racial schemas result in stigmatic harm, by which some groups are
treated as disfavored, with individual members considered to be dishonored persons and
consigned to outsider status.154
Lenhardt also argues that while categorization may be an inevitable human process, how
we classify and categorize, how we come to value and devalue with respect to racial difference,
is not natural or an internally driven phenomena. Our racial classification schemes come to us
from the social systems into which we are socialized. We internalize community norms
regarding normal and abnormal, about who should be regarded positively and who should be
regarded negatively. Societies create hierarchies to order social relations and some of these
hierarchies inflict harm and injustice.155
The turn to the work of Christian theologians may seem a strange detour in a law review
article.156 But long before the development of modern racial “science,” the idea of race emerged
within western medieval and early modern Christianity. Even though these developments
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occurred seven to eight centuries ago, the racialized imagination and hierarchical ordering of
human beings by skin color have continued to shape the racial schemas into which persons today
are socialized. As will be described below, this hierarchical racial ordering, which was believed
to be the objective truth about race, was explicitly present in American law until the 1960’s.
Since the 1960’s, race continues to shape the law and, most important for the purposes of this
essay, human interaction in the workplace.
J. Kameron Carter traces the formation of the category of race in medieval Europe to the
European Christian hostility to the Jewish persons and communities in their midst. This required
a theological maneuver that theologians have characterized as “supersessionism.” In both the
Hebrew scriptures and the early Christian writings of the first century that compose the Christian
canon of sacred writings, the Jewish people were understood to stand in a unique covenant
relationship with God that was designed to be the source of blessing for all of humanity.157 In the
first century, non-Jewish converts to Christianity understood themselves to have been
incorporated into God’s special relationship with Israel. Supersessionism is the notion that the
Christian church has replaced the Jewish people, who have been discarded or abandoned by God.
In the middle ages, white Europeans mapped themselves onto Israel’s special relationship with
God. This meant that the religious identity “Christian” and what will become a racial category,
whiteness, are merged together, with white Europeans as God’s “chosen” people. 158
In the middle ages, the foundation for the creation of race and white supremacy is laid
with the identification of Jewishness as a racial difference. As early as the twelfth and thirteenth

157 The

designations “Israelite” and “Hebrew” are used to refer to the Hebrew people prior to the destruction of the
capital city of Jerusalem by the Babylonian empire in the early sixth century B.C.E., followed by exile and
resettlement in Babylon. This people group came to be identified as “Jewish” and their religion as “Judaism.”
158 J. KAMERON C ARTER, R ACE : A THEOLOGICAL I NQUIRY, 4 (2008); See also KRISTOPHER NORRIS, WITNESSING
WHITENESS: WHITE SUPREMACY I N THE AMERICAN CHURCH, 46 (2020).

53

centuries, one finds an obsession with “marking and ensuring Jewish difference and
separateness.”159 The Fourth Lateran Council160 in 1215 began imposing regulations on the
activities of European Jews, including the ominous requirement in Spain and England that Jews
wear a badge of identification. This ruling was motivated, in part, by the fear that “through error
Christians have sexual relations with the women of Jews and Saracens.” 161 With Jewish identify
imagined as an inferior and defective racial identity, Jewish persons who converted to
Christianity were never entirely welcomed, but were viewed as suspect. In Spain, they were
labeled as swine (marranos). Jewish identity was regarded by much of the leadership of the
church as a perverse racial identity, at least partially irredeemable, which no amount of baptismal
water could entirely “wash away.”162
This fear of the “mixing of blood” and obsession with distinguishing and categorizing
people set the stage, tragically, for further injustice and exclusion in the “racially charged”
colonial encounter with another form of otherness. 163 The hostility toward Jews and Muslims
produced that tragic theological view that persons outside the faith were enemies of God and of
Christian civilization. As white Europeans encountered the non-white other who was
simultaneously the religious other, these two categories merged together. Europeans, who were
almost exclusively white-skinned, understood themselves as uniquely God’s people and as such,
the chosen and superior class of humanity. When they encountered non-Christian others who
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were simultaneously darker-skinned, a world viewed through the lens of a religious and racial
hierarchy emerged.164
What emerged was a sliding scale of humanity, with whiteness on the top of the scale as
the marker of true Christianity and true humanity. Whiteness became the measure by which
others were evaluated, the criterion for determining who was an insider and who was an outsider
and for determining who is more and who is less capable of rationality, morality, and religion.
This results in the creation of races as ordered hierarchically, with white as superior in
intelligence, civilization, and capacity for the religion and black flesh at the bottom of the
hierarchy as less intelligent, less capacity for being civilized without coercive discipline or
enslavement, and less capable of intellectually and spiritually mature Christian faith .165
Willie James Jennings describes this imagination at work in the Jesuit theologian
Alessandro Valignano (1539-1606), who viewed the Japanese as “white, courteous and highly
civilized,….naturally very intelligent. In contrast, Valignano spoke contemptuously of persons
with dark skin:
They are a very untalented race….incapable of grasping our holy religion or practicing it;
because of their naturally low intelligence, they cannot rise above the level of the senses;
they lack any culture and are given to savage ways and vices…..live like brute
beasts…..they are a race born to serve, with no natural aptitude for governing.
Vignano concluded that black flesh is reprobate flesh, belonging to the sphere of rejection
by God. On this racial scale, whiteness indicates high salvific probability, rooted in the signs of
movement toward God (e.g., cleanliness, intelligence, obedience, social hierarchy, and advanced
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civilization). For Valignano, the sign of African reprobation is that “they go around half naked,
have dirty food, practice polygamy, show avarice, and display marked stupidity.”166
Willie James Jennings also describes the creation of a racial aesthetic, with white flesh as
beautiful and black flesh as damaged and ugly flesh. Jennings draws upon the description, by
Portugal’s royal chronicler, Gomes Eanes de Azurar, of the arrival of a ship filled with persons
captured in Africa and placed in a field to be bid upon and possessed as slaves. The scene was
described in these terms:
And these, placed all together in that field, were a marvelous sight; for amongst them
were some white enough, fair to look upon, and well proportioned; others were less white
like mulattoes; others again were as black as Ethiops [Ethiopians], and so ugly, both in
features and in body, as almost to appear (to those who saw them) the images of a lower
hemisphere.167
This white aesthetic repeats itself in Christopher Columbus’s description of the natives he
encountered in what is today the southern portion of Venezuela. He described a canoe with
twenty-four men,
all young and fine looking and not negroes but rather the whitest of all those that I had
seen in the Indies, and they had graceful and fine had fine bodies and long, smooth hair
cut in the Castilian manner.168
For European explorers at this time, Jennings notes, the color white signified culture,
refinement, and a ‘just like us’ designation.169
However, this formation of a racialized optic and a racial scale of being was not merely a
matter of attitude. The logic that racial others are religious others and as such, enemies of Christ,
provided the sacred canopy to legitimate domination and slavery. Even before Christopher
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Columbus’ voyage, papal decrees had blessed the African slave trade by Portuguese explorers.
Muslims and Africans were both religious enemies and on that basis, explorers were granted full
authority “to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens and pagans
whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ, wheresoever placed, and reduce their persons to
perpetual servitude.”170 After Columbus’ return from “the new world,” Pope Alexander VI
issued two papal bulls in 1493 that were the founding documents of “Doctrine of Discovery,”
granting Spanish monarchs authority to expropriate any new land not owned by a Christian lord.
The theological vision that placed white Christians at the top of the human scale of being now
carried with it the mandate to subdue the earth and other people groups.171
The production, maintenance, and reproduction of social dominance requires legitimizing
ideologies or “myths” that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that
distribute social value within the social system.”172 The racial hierarchical imagination that
originated in western Europe has shaped the social imagination of generations of white western
persons, including white American citizens, for hundreds of year. In the United States, persons of
African descent were enslaved and after emancipation, subjected to other violent means of
control, from tenant farming to black codes and vagrancy laws to a brutal convict leasing
system.173 Lynching was a means of social control and African-Americans were subjected to de
jure segregation by Jim Crow laws and de jure residential segregation by federal and local
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housing policy until the 1960’s.174 The infamous Dred Scott175 decision defined black persons as
permanent outsiders. Theologian Kelly Brown Douglas argues that in the American social
imagination, the black body is hypersexualized, dangerous, and criminal. Writing in 2014, she
related this to the murder of Trayvon Martin and to police extra-judicial violence.176 Published in
2015, the book’s argument has only been tragically reinforced by the violent deaths suffered by
Tamir Rice, George Floyd and Armaud Arbery.
Of course, the nation’s history also includes denigration, exclusion, and mistreatment of
other non-white persons and groups, from the Chinese exclusion act to the tragically perennial
revival of nativism and hatred of immigrants. For example, Otto Santa Ana describes the
dehumanizing rhetoric often used to describe persons of Mexican descent entering or residing in
the United States. These images include a “rising brown tide” that will wash away Anglo-Saxon
cultural dominance, along with depictions of immigrants as animals, weeds that must be
uprooted, pathogens, enemies, criminals, and tax burdens.177
The patterns of racial hierarchy and the forms of domination, such as slavery and colonial
conquest, which emerged within medieval European Christianity, remain relevant to the analysis
and identification of contemporary modes of racial bias and discrimination. The racialized
hierarchical mapping of people groups generated by medieval European Christianity remains
deeply embedded within American public life, even if latent and often repressed.
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Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and others have proposed that all humans live
“within” a social imaginary, a picture of the world that shapes what we inchoately and intuitively
take to be common sense, what assume to be real, true, good and normal. The term “social
imaginary” describes the ways a people group imagines their social existence. Included within a
social imaginary are expectations about how humans are supposed to interact with one another in
different social spaces. Taylor stresses that the ways we “imagine” or world is not, first and
primarily, expressed in theoretical language, but is carried by stories, images, and legends. 178
Barry Harvey makes a similar point, contending that “all human endeavors, our relationships to
the people, places, and things around us—are situated within some network of metaphors and
analogies that generates our convictions and shapes our judgments about what is true, good, and
beautiful.”179 A social imaginary provides “a frame of reference for all our comings and goings,
our actions and affections, our desires and decisions, linking them together to form a hopefully
coherent account of our lives.”180
Prior to the 1960’s, white supremacy was assumed by the majority of Americans as
simply common sense, the way things are. In other words, white supremacy was a deeply
embedded feature of the American social imaginary. Until the 1960’s, as Robert P. Jones points
out, most white persons explicitly believed that African-Americans were biologically and
culturally inferior and incapable of assimilating into the American mainstream. 181 The social
transformations with respect to race in the 1960’s did not simply or instantaneously eradicate
deeply embedded modes of imagination with respect to race and racial hierarchy. In terms of the
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long arc of history, the fifty-eight years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the
proverbial blink of an eye.
Consider two bits of evidence that, in spite of sweeping social changes that began in the
1950’s and 1960’s, significant traces of this part of our collective social imaginary persist.
First, in one of the prominent black hairstyle cases, the plaintiff was told that she would
not be hired if she was planning to work with her dreadlocks. The interviewer made this
comment, "they tend to get messy, although I'm not saying yours are, but you know what I am
talking about."182 The interviewer’s assumptions about what constitutes acceptable, professional
hairstyle is a more than faint echo of Christopher Columbus’s positive assessment, more than six
hundred years earlier, of the long, smooth hair cut in the Castilian manner that he observed
among the native peoples in what is today the nation of Venezuela. Just like Columbus, the
interviewer assessed attractiveness and the acceptability of an employer’s hairstyle by way of
comparison with white norms.
Second, consider the dimensions of this long-standing social imaginary that have erupted
into view with the rhetoric of the previous president. As one example, former President Donald
Trump asked why the United States should accept more immigrants from “shithole” countries
such as Haiti and countries in Africa and asserted that "we should bring in more people from
places like Norway.”183 This crude comment may not have reproduced all of the sentiments
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articulated by Alessandro Valignano in the sixteenth century, but it certainly echoes Valignano’s
contempt for the people groups he encountered in Africa.
How might persistent and residual traces of the social imagination that was created by the
theological formation of race manifest itself in employment situations? While this list is not
exhaustive, racial discrimination in the workplace that manifests the traces of this longstanding
racial hierarchical imagination include:
(1) Perceptions of a racial minority employee as dangerous, as a threat.184 The racial schema
that imagined white skin to be correlated with a higher level of morality and darker skin
to be correlated with inferior morality has given rise to an association of darker skin,
whether black, Hispanic, “Middle Eastern,” etc., with criminality and violence.
(2) Treatment of the employee as if his/her presence was “transgressive.” The person is not
“in their place.” This is particularly the case when there is one non-white employee in a
workplace or workspace in which all the other employees are white. Outside of the
employment context, the phenomenon of white persons calling the police to report black
persons in public spaces where the white caller believed black persons should not be
present, illustrates this tendency.185
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(3) Patterns of separation and exclusion: Are non-white workers excluded from channels of
communication, networking relationships, and decision-making processes?
(4) A hierarchical imagination may manifest itself in a visceral reaction against a non-white
person in a role that involves authority over white employees or conversely, negative
evaluation of the job performance of a racial minority person who is not deemed
sufficiently deferential to white persons in positions of authority, or even sufficiently
deferential to white co-employees who are not in positions of managerial authority.
(5) Racial hierarchy stereotypes: Minority employees are stereotyped as less intelligent or
less capable.
(6) A racial aesthetic: a minority candidate is treated as unprofessional to the extent that she
or he does not conform to white corporate or business norms in dress or hairstyles. The
black hairstyle cases illustrate how deeply embedded are these aesthetic norms.
VI. Testing the Thesis: The Workplace Experiences Survey
The confirmation that this social imaginary continues to impact discrimination in the
workplace is found, in part, in the research of Joan Williams, Rachel Korn, and Sky Mihaylo.
The Workplace Experiences Survey (“WES”) provides a fine-grained description of how racial
and gender bias play out in everyday workplace interactions in pervasive and persistent patterns
that are broadly recognized. The WES confirms that variations of the racial hierarchical social
imaginary that were part of the theological formation of the “idea” of race and the accompanying
hierarchical racialized optic persist as identifiable and pervasive patterns of bias and
discrimination in the workplace. 186
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Williams and her colleagues shift the focus from cognitive psychology to social
psychology, which focuses on the social dimensions of human action. The WES is a simple tenminute bias climate survey that asks people whether they have experienced bias and where. 187
The WES’s combination of both laboratory and field studies, which includes the survey itself,
offers objective evidence of the pervasiveness of certain patterns of discrimination in the
workplace.188
The first pattern of bias is categorized as the “Prove-it-Again bias.” Women and racial
minority persons have to prove themselves more than white men do. Women and many nonwhite persons find that they need to provide more evidence of competence in order to be seen as
equally competent. Resumes of people of color get evaluated more negatively than identical
resumes of white people. Prove-It-Again bias reflects assumptions that groups lower in status are
less competent and less intelligent.189
Obviously, the “Prove-it-Again-bias” indicates that a racial and gendered hierarchical
imagination is extremely pervasive.190 Black people and LatinX individuals are stereotyped as
less competent than white people. This has measurable consequences that have been
demonstrated over and over again in lab and audit studies. White applicants are more than twice
as likely to be considered for a job than identical Black applicants. One of the “identical resume
studies” shows that “Jamal” needed to have eight more years of experience to get called back at
the same rate as “Greg.”191 Mistakes made by a woman or non-white person tend to be

187 Id.
188 Id.

at 341-42.
at 341.
190 Since the focus of this essay is racial employment discrimination, addressing the ways in which a gender
hierarchy ha s even longer history is beyond the parameters of this essay.
191 Williams, et al., supra. note 19, at 359-60 (citing Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at
Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. I SSUES 221, 226 (2012)).
189 Id.

63

remembered longer and colleagues are more likely to notice more of their mistakes. 192 Since
persons tend to see what we expect to see, a phenomenon known as confirmation bias, racial and
gendered stereotypes of incompetence or lower intelligence lead to this result. 193
Prove-it-again bias shapes how one’s ideas are received by others. In the WES, women
and non-white persons reported that others often get credit for the ideas they originally presented
at much higher rates than white men report stolen ideas. 194
Williams and colleagues also call attention to dynamics of exclusion in professions
dominated by white men from elite backgrounds. White men within that demographic find it
easier to gain sponsors, to be “in the know,” and to get the benefit of the doubt. 195 In-group
favoritism will result in sponsorship and information advantages. The strongest determinant of
who is in one’s social network is similarity. People tend to build social networks made up of
people who are like them. If the professional workplace was traditionally all but exclusively
composed of privileged white men from elite backgrounds and continues to be predominantly
composed of privileged white men from elite backgrounds, then those they sponsor (i.e., whose
careers they champion) will tend to be same-class white men and their bonding activities will
likely be class-linked (e.g., golf). Valuable information, such as plum assignments or sales
opportunities, tend to be shared through social networks. 196
For example, plaintiffs in a disparate impact case succeeded in receiving class
certification because they were able to describe precisely how in-group favoritism operated to
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deprive black brokers of equal opportunities. They explained how Merrill-Lynch’s “teaming”
policy functioned to create “little fraternities” of white brokers who chose to work with other
white brokers like themselves. This meant that black brokers found it difficult to access the
teaming that led to information crucial to gaining access to lucrative accounts. The plaintiffs
succeeded because they were able to craft a narrative that explained in detail how stereotyping
contributed to these mechanisms of exclusion that affected the defendant’s workplace.197
Williams and colleagues also describe the ways in which prescriptive stereotypes about
how persons lower in status ought to behave function. Behaviors that signify competence,
mastery and leadership are more accepted from white men than from women and persons of
color, male or female. Anger is also perceived as more unacceptable and threatening when
coming from racial minorities. This makes it more difficult to exercise or establish authority
when the person’s position requires it. Persons from lower status groups, whether gender-related
or race-related, are typically expected to be deferential rather than dominant, to act in ways that
demonstrate that the person knows his or her place in a real but rarely explicitly articulated status
hierarchy. For example, studies have found that white Americans both expect individuals of
Asian descent to be passive and tend to dislike those who display dominant behavior. 198 A Latinx
woman scientist reported that she was treated as if she was angry when she was not angry. Her
“wrong” was that she was not deferential, which triggered a prescriptive gender stereotype of the
“hot-blooded Latina woman.199 Such prescriptive stereotypes mean that assertive behavior by
African-American men triggers fear or hostility in predominantly white workplaces. Black men
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are quickly stereotyped as violent and quick to anger. Due to the operation of stereotypes of
black men as dangerous, when Black men display merely assertive behavior, they are at risk of
triggering the “violent” stereotype and be classified as “intimidating.”
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In these ways, features of the racialized hierarchical imagination remain in play. Nonwhite persons are expected to act in deferential ways that express inferiority and when black men
or other non-white persons express anger, they are viewed as dangerous, potentially criminal,
and presumed to be less moral and in control of themselves.
Similarly, the exercise of authority outside of a racial hierarchical ordering may trigger
resistance from white persons. For example, a LatinX science professor had trouble getting the
white administrative assistants to do routine work for her that they d id without question or
resistance for other professors. She noted their resentment that she, a Mexican woman, was
telling them what to do.201

Concluding Reflections: Making Connections and Pulling the Strands
Together
As a law school student, I worked as a clerk at a small employment law firm. While in
this position, I contributed to the representation of a client who filed a racial discrimination
complaint with the state agency responsible for the adjudication of discrimination complaints.
While the case was not a Title VII case brought to federal court, the state law was modeled upon
Title VII.
Prior to his termination, “Smith”202 had communicated by email with the Human
Resources Director. He wrote that he was having “by far the worst experience that [he had] ever
200 Id.

at 371.
at 389.
202 Smith is not his real name. For the sake of confidentiality, I am describing events in such a way as to avoid the
possibility of disclosing the identities of the actual parties in this employment action.
201 Id.
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had at a company.” He noted that he was the only African-American in a management position at
the location of the company where he worked. “Smith” believed that he had been consistently
sabotaged by management in the tier above him. He was cut out of crucial meetings with his own
customers, as well as from internal conversations. In a company reorganization, he was the only
manager whose input was not sought and the only manager excluded from any information
regarding his new role until the reorganization was announced to the entire company. In his new
role, his official responsibility was that of a liaison between the company’s IT department and
customers learning how to use new industrial management software in ways that best fit their
needs. But instead, he was often assigned new and complicated technical IT tasks which were
outside the parameters of his new job description. Then he was blamed for having a bad attitude
when he indicated that these were technical competencies outside of his area of expertise. He
was, he firmly believed, set up to fail by management in the tier above him.
The company presented, as evidence that Smith’s termination was for “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, a performance evaluation. Smith’s overall performance rating was 1 star
out of 3, which meant “failing to meet performance expectations.” But a close reading of this
evaluation revealed that this rating was blatantly arbitrary. There were positive comments
sprinkled throughout the review. Most tellingly, there was not a single comment offering a
rationale for this rating or any indication of precisely how he failed to meet performance
expectations.
Something was clearly amiss, but it was difficult to prove discriminatory intent. No one
hurled racial epithets at Smith. He overheard a conversation in the hallway. Another member of
the management team stated that he left a youth basketball tournament he attended with his
children because things were getting tense and some of the players on the other team “were of a
67

darker skin tone.” Smith claims that another manager made a comment, in a meeting in which
Smith was present and after the murder of George Floyd, that he might need to “put a knee on
the neck” of one of the company’s suppliers. However, the manager denied that he made the
statement. However, both of these comments would be dismissed if the court applied the
“moment of decision” and “stray remarks” doctrines since Smith would not have been able to
connect either comment to the actual decision to terminate his employment.
Though Smith believed that the supervisor above him was biased against him and played
the most pivotal role in sabotaging him, Smith faced subtle biases which had a cumulative effect.
When I wrote the initial brief seeking a “probable cause” determination to the state adjudicatory
agency,203 I was not confident of a determination favorable to our client. I engaged in the
McDonnell-Douglas analysis and endeavored to make the case that the employer’s stated
rationale was pretext for discrimination. But given the lack of “smoking gun evidence” and the
employer’s proffered reasons for its adverse employment action, I held my breath as I waited,
lacking confidence that we had enough evidence to persuade the fact finder at the first stage of
the adjudicatory process.
But how might the patterns identified as rooted in the very origins of the western creation
of “race” as a hierarchical scale of being, from white to black permit Smith’s attorney to weave
together a persuasive narrative to convince the finder of fact that Smith was a victim of
impermissible discrimination? How might the correspondence between this long-standing racial
optic and the patterns detected by the Workplace Experiences Study permit Smith’s attorney to

firm was not pursuing Smith’s claim in federal court under Title VII. However, the state employment law
governing race discrimination claims is closely modeled on Title VII.
203 My
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highlight the patterns of racial bias in a way that makes the racial discrimination he experienced
more evident to the trier of fact?
First, Smith was a confident person who spoke out and advocated for his ideas. This
antagonized one of the supervisors who clearly had a visceral dislike for Smith. As in Hicks, a
court or adjudicatory body could easily believe that Smith was fired because the supervisor did
not like him on a personal level rather than believing that Smith was fired because of racial
discrimination. But if the proposed categories operate as a lens for detecting patterns of racial
interaction, it is clear that Smith’s self-confidence and willingness to advocate for his ideas and
disagree with management colleagues triggered long-standing racial schemas. Smith was not
sufficiently deferential to his white colleagues. While Smith was sometimes invited to the table,
his willingness to speak on equal terms with his colleagues was resented. Smith’s presence was
now transgressive. He was a black person in white space. And since he stood up for himself and
his viewpoints about how things should be done, he broke the unspoken rules by stepping out of
a subordinate place in the hierarchy.
In response, Smith’s colleagues began to isolate him to exclude him from white space. He
was cut out of conversations with his customers and excluded from the conversations about the
company’s reorganization. Then, the tropes and stereotypes about black incompetence shaped
the ways in which he was treated as incompetent and put in situations designed to set him up to
fail, thereby confirming his incompetence. His supposed failures, caused by being asked to
complete IT tasks outside his job description, were viewed by his colleagues and supervisors as
further evidence of his incompetence. As noted by the Workplace Experiences Survey, his
mistakes were noticed and amplified in the minds of his colleagues. Finally, Smith’s willingness
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to complain about discrimination to Human Resources triggered a response from colleagues and
managers who regarded his anger as threatening.
If this care were in federal court, two racist comments, one of which Smith overheard that
was not directed to him personally, and which was, might be dismissed as stray remarks.
However, if Smith were permitted, in the wake of Costa, to present direct and circumstantial
evidence of discrimination, these remarks would be taken seriously as evidence of racial bias.
Ironically, the two comments are tethered to long-standing racial schemas and stereotypes. The
supervisor who commented about leaving a youth basketball tournament because things were
getting tense and some of the players were of a darker skin tone, unwittingly invoked the
stereotype correlating dark skin with danger and immorality. The comment about a knee to the
neck of the vendor was even more insidious. Given that the comment was designed to be heard
by Smith, the comment invoked white dominance over black bodies and constituted a
performance by which the supervisor sought to assert dominance over Smith. The comment
reflected the very origins of a racialized optic in that black bodies place in the hierarchy require
enslavement and domination to subdue immoral and violent impulses.
By weaving these elements together, the litigator is able to expose the partially hidden
and covert racial biases by inserting the facts into a narrative pattern that makes visible and
manifest what was hidden in the fragments. But when the fragments are “glued together” by
situating them within a long-standing pattern of racialized hierarchy, with its ongoing patterns of
latent racial bias, a persuasive story becomes possible.
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